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本帖最后由 匿名 于 2023-3-11 09:47 编辑
小伙伴们赶紧自己check一下自己的存款情况。
【链接】和【中文翻译】如下 ..
有帮助的话给颗【大米】,谢谢!
. .и
https://twitter.com/BillAckman/status/1634564398919368704-baidu 1point3acres
The gov’t has about 48 hours to fix a-soon-to-be-irreversible mistake. By allowing @SVB_Financial to fail without protecting all depositors, the world has woken up to what an uninsured deposit is — an unsecured illiquid claim on a failed bank. Absent @jpmorgan @citi or @BankofAmerica acquiring SVB before the open on Monday, a prospect I believe to be unlikely, or the gov’t guaranteeing all of SVB’s deposits, the giant sucking sound you will hear will be the withdrawal of substantially all uninsured deposits from all but the ‘systemically important banks’ (SIBs). These funds will be transferred to the SIBs, US Treasury (UST) money market funds and short-term UST. There is already pressure to transfer cash to short-term UST and UST money market accounts due to the substantially higher yields available on risk-free UST vs. bank deposits. These withdrawals will drain liquidity from community, regional and other banks and begin the destruction of these important institutions. The increased demand for short-term UST will drive short rates lower complicating the @federalreserve’s efforts to raise rates to slow the economy. Already thousands of the fastest growing, most innovative venture-backed companies in the U.S. will begin to fail to make payroll next week. Had the gov’t stepped in on Friday to guarantee SVB’s deposits (in exchange for penny warrants which would have wiped out the substantial majority of its equity value) this could have been avoided and SVB’s 40-year franchise value could have been preserved and transferred to a new owner in exchange for an equity injection. We would have been open to participating. This approach would have minimized the risk of any gov’t losses, and created the potential for substantial profits from the rescue. Instead, I think it is now unlikely any buyer will emerge to acquire the failed bank. The gov’t’s approach has guaranteed that more risk will be concentrated in the SIBs at the expense of other banks, which itself creates more systemic risk. For those who make the case that depositors be damned as it would create moral hazard to save them, consider the feasibility of a world where each depositor must do their own credit assessment of the bank they choose to bank with. I am a pretty sophisticated financial analyst and I find most banks to be a black box despite the 1,000s of pages of @SECGov filings available on each bank. SVB’s senior management made a basic mistake. They invested short-term deposits in longer-term, fixed-rate assets. Thereafter short-term rates went up and a bank run ensued. Senior management screwed up and they should lose their jobs. The @FDICgov and OCC also screwed up. It is their job to monitor our banking system for risk and SVB should have been high on their watch list with more than $200B of assets and $170B of deposits from business borrowers in effectively the same industry. The FDIC’s and OCC’s failure to do their jobs should not be allowed to cause the destruction of 1,000s of our nation’s highest potential and highest growth businesses (and the resulting losses of 10s of 1,000s of jobs for some of our most talented younger generation) while also permanently impairing our community and regional banks’ access to low-cost deposits. This administration is particularly opposed to concentrations of power. Ironically, its approach to SVB’s failure guarantees duopolistic banking risk concentration in a handful of SIBs. My back-of-the envelope review of SVB’s balance sheet suggests that even in a liquidation, depositors should eventually get back about 98% of their deposits, but eventually is too long when you have payroll to meet next week. So even without assigning any franchise value to SVB, the cost of a gov’t guarantee of SVB deposits would be minimal. On the other hand, the unintended consequences of the gov’t’s failure to guarantee SVB deposits are vast and profound and need to be considered and addressed before Monday. Otherwise, watch out below.
政府有大约48小时的时间来纠正一个很快就会被逆转的错误。通过允许@SVB_Financial倒闭而不保护所有储户,世界已经醒悟到什么是无保险的存款--对倒闭银行的无担保非流动性债权。如果@摩根大通@花旗银行或@美国银行在周一开盘前没有收购SVB(我认为这种可能性不大),或者政府为SVB的所有存款提供担保,你将听到巨大的吸吮声,除了 "系统性重要银行"(SIBs)之外,所有未投保的存款都将被提取。这些资金将被转移到SIBs、美国财政部(UST)货币市场基金和短期UST。由于无风险的美国国债的收益率大大高于银行存款,已经存在将现金转移到短期美国国债和美国国债货币市场账户的压力。这些提款将耗尽社区、地区和其他银行的流动性,并开始破坏这些重要机构。对短期美国国债的需求增加,将推动短期利率降低,使其变得复杂。美联储 提高利率以减缓经济的努力。美国已经有数千家发展最快、最具创新性的风险投资支持的公司将在下周开始无法支付工资。如果政府在周五介入,为SVB的存款提供担保(以换取一分钱的认股权证,这将使其大部分股权价值化为乌有),这种情况就可以避免,SVB的40年特许经营权价值就可以保留下来,并转让给新的所有者,以换取股权注入。我们本来是愿意参与的。这种方法可以将政府损失的风险降到最低,并创造出从救援中获得大量利润的可能性。相反,我认为现在不太可能出现任何买家来收购这家破产银行。政府的做法保证了更多的风险将集中在SIBs,而牺牲其他银行的利益,这本身就造成了更多的系统性风险。对于那些提出储户会被诅咒,因为拯救他们会造成道德风险的人来说,请考虑这样一个世界的可行性,即每个储户必须对他们选择的银行进行自己的信用评估。我是一个相当成熟的金融分析师,我发现大多数银行都是一个黑盒子,尽管有1000多页的 证券交易委员会政府 的文件。SVB的高级管理层犯了一个基本错误。他们将短期存款投资于长期的固定利率资产。此后,短期利率上升,银行挤兑事件随之发生。高级管理层搞砸了,他们应该失去工作。这 基金会政府 和OCC也搞砸了。他们的工作是监测我们的银行系统的风险,而SVB本应在他们的观察名单上名列前茅,因为它有超过2000亿美元的资产和1700亿美元的存款,而这些存款实际上来自同一行业的商业借款人。FDIC和OCC的失职不应该被允许导致我们国家1000家最具潜力和最高增长的企业被摧毁(以及由此导致我们最有才华的年轻一代损失1000多个工作岗位),同时也会永久损害我们社区和区域银行获得低成本存款的机会。本届政府特别反对权力的集中。具有讽刺意味的是,它对SVB失败的处理方式保证了银行业的双头垄断风险集中在少数几个SIB中。我对SVB的资产负债表的审查表明,即使在清算中,储户最终也应该拿回约98%的存款,但当你下周要支付工资时,最终就太长了。因此,即使不给SVB分配任何特许权价值,政府为SVB的存款提供担保的成本也是最低的。另一方面,政府不为SVB的存款提供担保所带来的意外后果是巨大而深刻的,需要在周一之前加以考虑和解决。否则,请注意以下几点。 |