【请大家参与评论】H‑1B 申请拟额外收费 $103,265，境内外申请均受影响

第一次评论政府 感觉核心论点就是 这个proposal不仅基本收不到钱 还会推动大公司outsource职位到海外 让政府丢失税收 小公司招聘人才时间金钱成本增加

今年我才抽中；这个法案就算通过影不影响今年的h1b？

除了上面评论里的观点还有以下补充的观点，供参考
1.        对美国大学（Higher Education）的打击： 绝大多数 Cap-subject H-1B 属于在美国拿了 Master/PhD 的留学生（Change of Status）。这一政策会直接腰斩美国高等教育对全球顶尖 STEM 生源的吸引力，导致人才直接流向加拿大、欧洲等政策更友好的国家。
2.        中小企业（Small Business & Startups）被挤出： 10 万美元的额外成本对于巨头科技公司来说或许可以咬牙承受，但会彻底抹杀初创公司和中小企业引进关键技术人才的可能，直接破坏市场自由竞争。
3.        法律越权风险（Statutory Authority）： DHS 试图通过行政规章收取数十亿资金用于填补整个移民系统的运营预算，这超出了《移民与国籍法》（INA）授权 USCIS “仅按实际审理成本收费”的法律边界，本质上是一种未经国会授权的非法征税。

我还参考了之前评论里的另外两个观点：
除了经济层面的扭曲，该政策还会带来以下不可忽视的隐患：
• 摧毁美国高等教育与 STEM 竞争力： 这切断了美国高校培养的优秀留学生的留美通道。外国顶尖人才将转向加拿大、欧洲或澳大利亚，导致美国大学失去重要学费来源和顶尖研究力量。
• 人才流失与创新中心外移： 强制企业将岗位外包，意味着核心知识产权、研发中心以及相关的税收收入将永久离开美国，最终削弱美国的全球科技领先地位。

留言抗议了，顶上去

已经comment了，希望这个法案能废除！

已评论

zichaowu 发表于 2026-08-26 21:39:29
今年我才抽中；这个法案就算通过影不影响今年的h1b？

经典闹钟之先看看和我有没有关系，死道友不死贫道

让AI读了几次这个proposed rule，分析出了以下可以攻击的点，随便抽出一个展开应该就可以写一个comment，仅供参考：

DOES DHS HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE THIS FEE?

The proposed fee would fund immigration courts, removal-related vetting, border systems, refugee programs, other visa programs, labor enforcement, government lawyers, and other general government operations. Many of these activities have little or nothing to do with reviewing an H-1B petition. What gives DHS the authority to make H-1B employers pay for all of them? If the employer receives no specific service or benefit in return, how can this be called a user fee rather than a tax? Why would DHS’s belief that some employers can afford the fee give it legal authority that Congress never clearly granted?

DOES DHS’S ANALYSIS SHOW THAT EMPLOYERS WILL KEEP FILING?

DHS compares the number of petitions filed by an employer with the total amount that employer pays in fees. But an employer that files more petitions automatically pays more in total fees, even if the price of each petition never changes. How can this circular relationship show what employers will do when the price of each petition suddenly rises to $103,265? The closest real-world comparison involved initial cap-exempt H-1B petitions requesting consular processing—generally cases outside the annual cap in which the worker would obtain an H-1B visa abroad and enter the United States rather than change status inside the country—and receipts fell by more than 90 percent after a separate $100,000 payment was introduced. Although that group is not identical to the employers covered by this proposal, why does DHS downplay the only observed example involving a similar price increase?

DOES DHS UNDERESTIMATE THE EFFECT ON SMALL BUSINESSES?

DHS estimates the burden as if each affected small employer will pay the new fee only once. However, its own recent data show more than 106,000 cap-subject petitions filed by fewer than 29,000 employers, or about 3.7 petitions per employer. At that rate, the average employer would pay approximately $385,000 rather than $103,265. Why did DHS analyze only one fee per employer when the fee is charged for every petition? How can DHS understand the actual effect on small businesses without examining how many petitions each business files?

WHY DOES DHS ASSUME THAT EXACTLY 85,000 PETITIONS WILL PAY THE FEE?

The H-1B program generally allows 85,000 new cap-subject approvals each year, but employers normally file more petitions because some petitions are denied, rejected, or withdrawn. DHS nevertheless assumes that exactly 85,000 petitions will pay the fee, which produces almost exactly the $8.78 billion it wants to raise. If the recent filing volume of more than 106,000 petitions continued, DHS would collect about $11 billion—roughly $2.24 billion more than its stated need. What would happen to that extra money, and what would prevent DHS from overcollecting? Conversely, if the fee causes filings to collapse, how would DHS fund programs that depend on the expected revenue?

HAS DHS FULLY CONSIDERED THE ECONOMIC DAMAGE?

Some employers could face this new $103,265 fee in addition to a separate $100,000 H-1B payment, bringing the combined special charges above $203,000 for a single petition. At that price, many employers may move jobs overseas, cancel projects, reduce research, or stop sponsoring skilled workers. Why does DHS assume that employers will simply hire U.S. workers instead of moving or cancelling the work? Would the rule not give large multinational companies an advantage because they can relocate work more easily than smaller companies? Could the proposal therefore reduce American jobs, investment, and innovation rather than protect them?

HOW CAN THE PUBLIC EVALUATE INFORMATION DHS HAS NOT RELEASED?

DHS provides broad spending totals but not the complete budgets, calculations, allocation methods, underlying data, or interagency agreements behind them. Without this information, the public cannot determine whether the claimed costs are reasonable, related to immigration application processing, or counted more than once. How can the public meaningfully evaluate an $8.78-billion annual fee without seeing how that amount was calculated? If important details are still being decided, how can DHS rely on them to finalize the rule? Should DHS not disclose the missing information and give the public another opportunity to comment?